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Manner of Debtor’s Dispute Under the FDCPA  
is in Dispute 
Laura Atack
*
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Debt collection is a pervasive issue in the United States that cuts 
across race, gender, and socio-economic class.
1
 Estimates show 
between thirty million
2
 and seventy-seven million
3
 Americans have at 
least one debt in collections and roughly one million debts are 
disputed every year.
4
 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) receives 
 
 
* J.D. (2015), Washington University in St. Louis. I would like to thank my fiancé, 
Christopher Rapking, for his valuable suggestions and support, and the Consumer Group at the 
Legal Aid Society of Columbus for strengthening my interests in and dedication to consumer 
protection issues. 
 1. One study of households with moderate-income reported that “there were no 
significant differences in the frequency of African American and white households declaring 
bankruptcy, being evicted, or having property repossessed. African American households were 
far more likely than whites to be called by bill collectors as a result of their debt.” CATHERINE 
RUETSCHLIN, DĒMOS & DEDRICK ASANTE-MUHAMMAD, NAACP, THE CHALLENGE OF CREDIT 
CARD DEBT FOR THE AFRICAN AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASS 20 (2013), available at 
http://action.naacp.org/page/-/economic%20opportunity%20documents/CreditCardDebt-
Demos_NAACP.pdf. 
 2. Shining a Light on the Consumer Debt Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Fin. Insts. & Consumer Prot. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 113th 
Cong. 3 (2013) (statement of Corey Stone, Assistant Dir., Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau) (“By our best estimate, 30 million people have one or more debts in collection.”). 
 3. CAROLINE RATCLIFFE ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, DELINQUENT DEBT IN AMERICA 7 
(2014), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/413191-Delinquent-Debt-in-America. 
pdf. The Urban Institute collected its data from TransUnion credit reports. Id. at 1. “Among the 
estimated 220 million US adults that have a credit file, we estimate that 35 percent, or 77 
million US adults, have debt in collections reported in their credit files.” Id. at 11 n.15. The 
Urban Institute has acknowledged that its figures may actually underrepresent low-income 
individuals, who are less likely to have a credit file. Id. at 1. 
 4. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES OF THE DEBT 
BUYING INDUSTRY iv (2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/structure-practices-debt-
buying-industry [hereinafter FTC REPORT]. This estimate only reflects the number of debts that 
debt buyers, and not original creditors or other third-party collectors, seek to collect. Id. at 37–
38. While debt buyers may be more likely to initially pursue invalid debts due to documentation 
issues involved in the debt-buying process, id. at 31, it may be assumed that at least some debts 
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more complaints about debt collection practices than any other 
industry,
5
 and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has 
received more than 18,000 complaints in the past six months.
6
 A 
review of the CFPB’s complaint log summarizes many of the 
problems with debt collection and the abusive tactics of certain 
collectors.
7
 But even legal debt collection tactics can have dire 
consequences for households and can drive households with lower 
incomes further into poverty.
8
 
In 1977, Congress enacted the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
(FDCPA)
9
 to alleviate problems and abuses associated with debt 
collection,
10
 including the collection of potentially invalid debts, such 
as those that are no longer or were never owed. Debtors and debt 
collectors alike have a multitude of rights protected under the statute. 
One significant feature for consumer protection is a debtor’s right to 
dispute the debt.
11
 A debtor may dispute when, for example, the debt 
was already paid in full, was discharged in bankruptcy, or was never 
owed by that debtor, whether by mistake or identity theft. A debtor’s 
dispute triggers many additional protections, including the right to 
 
from original creditors are also disputed. Further, the report indicates that during its study, not 
all debt buyers were able to provide information on orally-disputed debts. Id. at 38. 
 5. FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at i. 
 6. Consumer Complaint Database, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), 
https://data.consumerfinance.gov/dataset/Debt-collection-complaints/fphp-cr5a (last visited 
May 16, 2015). The CFPB’s Consumer Complaint Database reports more than 18,000 
complaints about debt collection were filed between November 15, 2014 and May 15, 2015. Id.  
 7. Id. The complaint log shows a variety of issues with debt collection that range from 
clerical or procedural issues (e.g., collecting from the wrong debtor; pursuing the wrong 
amount; debt has already been paid or discharged in bankruptcy) to more egregious violations 
(e.g., no receipt of right to dispute notice; frequent or repeated calls, or calls after debtor 
requested communication cease; contacting debtor’s employer against debtor’s wishes; 
indicating nonpayment is a crime and threatening arrest or jail; using profane, abusive, or other 
obscene language). Id. 
 8. See CAROLYN CARTER & ROBERT J. HOBBS, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., NO FRESH 
START: HOW STATES LET DEBT COLLECTORS PUSH FAMILIES INTO POVERTY 7 (2013), 
available at http://www.dispatch.com/content/downloads/2013/10/report-no-fresh-start.pdf 
(suggesting that insufficient wage and asset garnishment or levy exemptions allow debt 
collections to impoverish families). 
 9. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (1977). 
 10. Id. § 1692(a). 
 11. Id. § 1692g. 
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verify the debt, prevent an assumption of validity on the part of the 
debt collector, and potentially prevent further collection efforts.
12
  
Knowledge of these rights is vital to protecting debtors’ ability to 
exercise them.
13
 Therefore, as a safeguard, § 1692g of the FDCPA 
requires collectors to inform debtors of their rights under the FDCPA 
via a written notice within five days of initial communication.
14
 Yet 
the FDCPA is not entirely clear on debtors’ dispute rights, 
specifically how a debtor must communicate her dispute to a 
collector: in writing or orally. Private actions for FDCPA violations 
have brought to light inconsistencies in the manner in which debtors 
are required to dispute their debts. The issue presented here involves 
the acceptable manner of the debtor’s dispute within the creditor’s 
initial notice, and I argue that allowing a debtor to orally dispute her 
debt is not just sufficient, but preferable, under the FDCPA. 
Subsection (a) of § 1692g governs the debt collector’s notice 
requirements.
15
 Three provisions, § 1692g(a)(3)-(5), require that the 
 
 12. § 1692g(a)(3)-(5), (b). 
13.  See Consumer Information: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of 
the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin., and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 212 (1977) (statement of 
Christian S. White, Assistant Dir. Spec. Stats., F.T.C.) (“[C]onsumers cannot be expected to 
exercise rights they are ignorant of.”). 
 14. § 1692g(a). 
 15. Section 1692g(a) reads:  
Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with 
the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is 
contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the 
consumer a written notice containing:  
 (1) the amount of the debt; 
 (2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; 
 (3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the 
notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be 
assumed to be valid by the debt collector; 
 (4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the 
thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector 
will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a 
copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt 
collector; and 
 (5) a statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty-day 
period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the 
original creditor, if different from the current creditor.  
Id. 
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collector’s notice include statements informing the debtor of her right 
to dispute and obtain verification.
16
 Sections 1692g(a)(4) and (5) 
explicitly require the debtor’s dispute and request for verification to 
be written.
17
 However, the plain language of the assumption-of-
validity provision, § 1692g(a)(3),
18
 which prevents the collector from 
assuming the debt to be valid, does not explicitly require that a debtor 
dispute the debt in writing.
19
 Lawsuits against debt collectors for 
FDCPA violations have exposed an inconsistency in interpretations 
of the notice requirements under the assumption-of-validity 
provision.
20
 The question remains: can the debtor trigger certain 
rights under the FDCPA solely by oral dispute, or must the debtor put 
her dispute in writing in order to avail herself of all the protections 
under § 1692g? 
Since 1991, when the Third Circuit decided in Graziano v. 
Harrison that the assumption-of-validity provision required a 
debtor’s dispute to be in writing,21 only three other circuits have 
addressed this issue.
22
 The Supreme Court has yet to weigh in and 
specifically declined to do so in 2010.
23
 The trend among the district 
courts is to follow the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits’ approach, 
which is to allow a debtor to successfully invoke some rights under 
the FDCPA with an oral dispute.
24
 In the interest of furthering the 
 
 16. § 1629g(a)(3)-(5) 
 17. § 1692g(a)(4) (“[A] statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in 
writing . . .”) (emphasis added); § 1692g(a)(5) (“[A] statement that, upon the consumer’s 
written request . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 18. § 1692g(a)(3). For the purposes of this Note, I am referring to this subsection as the 
“assumption-of-validity provision.” 
 19. § 1692g(a)(3) (“[A] statement that unless the consumer . . . disputes . . .”). 
 20. See, e.g., Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 112 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding collector 
can require written dispute); Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 430 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 
2005) (holding debtor is allowed to orally dispute); Hooks v. Forman, Holt, Eliades & Ravin, 
LLC, 717 F.3d 282, 286 (2d Cir. 2013) (same); Clark v. Absolute Collection Serv., Inc., 741 
F.3d 487, 490 (4th Cir. 2014) (same). 
 21. Graziano, 950 F.2d at 112. 
 22. See Camacho, 430 F.3d at 1082; Hooks, 717 F.3d at 287; Clark, 741 F.3d at 486. 
 23. Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 580 n.3 
(2010) (“Because the question was not raised on appeal, the Court of Appeals did not address 
whether Carlisle’s inclusion of the ‘in writing’ requirement violated § 1692g. We likewise 
express no view . . . as that question was not presented in the petition for certiorari.”).  
 24. See, e.g., Busch v. Valarity, LLC, No. 4:12–CV–2372–JAR, 2014 WL 466221, at *4 
(E.D. Mo. Feb. 5, 2014) (“Some district courts have followed the Third Circuit’s reasoning in 
Graziano . . . . The majority of district courts, however, have disagreed with Graziano and 
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FDCPA’s purpose by providing protection to debtors and consistent 
standards among states, this is the correct trend. 
Part I of this Note examines the history of the FDCPA and the 
cases that have given rise to the circuit split. Part II discusses the 
statutory interpretation devices employed by the courts creating the 
split and analyzes the policy considerations behind each outcome. 
Part III proposes that a continued shift permitting debtors to raise a 
dispute orally is desirable, but notes that the circuit split may remain 
in place until the Supreme Court weighs in or the Third Circuit 
departs from its reasoning in Graziano.
25
 Finally, Part IV concludes, 
noting that this Note’s proposed interpretation comports with the 
plain language and purposes of the FDCPA. 
II. HISTORY 
A. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
Congress enacted the FDCPA in 1977 after finding that there were 
inadequate laws protecting consumers from “abusive, deceptive, and 
unfair debt collection practices.”26 The legislation had broad support 
from both consumer and collector associations.
27
 The purpose of the 
Act was to provide consistent statutory protection for consumers 
from abusive practices, while still protecting debt collectors’ ability 
to collect on behalf of their clients.
28
 Under the law, a debtor can 
bring a civil action against a debt collector for violating any provision 
of the FDCPA
29
 and can claim damages actually sustained from the 
violation, as well as additional statutory damages of up to $1,000, 
attorney’s fees, and court costs.30 
 
concluded that § 1692g(a)(3) does not impose a writing requirement on consumers.”). Busch 
goes on to cite seventeen district court cases from eleven different districts. Id. 
 25. 950 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 26. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) (1977).  
 27. See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. 28, 113 (1977) (statement of Rep. Frank Annunzio) (noting 
“express support” of American Collectors Association and Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc. and 
“strong support of consumer groups, labor unions, and State and Federal law enforcement 
officials”).  
 28. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). 
 29. Id. § 1692k. 
 30. § 1692k(a) 
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Section 1692g governs the validation of debts and requires notices 
from collectors advising debtors of their rights. Congress enacted this 
debt validation and notice section to “eliminate the recurring problem 
of debt collectors dunning the wrong person or attempting to collect 
debts which the consumer has already paid” without “additional 
expense or paperwork” to the debt collector.31 Section 1692g(a)(3) 
prevents a debt collector from assuming a debt is valid if the debtor 
has disputed it.
32
 However, a debtor’s failure to dispute the debt 
within the thirty-day period, or at all—thereby triggering the 
collector’s assumption of validity—cannot operate as an admission of 
liability.
33
 Therefore, absent a dispute, the assumption-of-validity 
provision allows the debt collector to continue its collection efforts 
ethically, but does not grant the ability to obtain a judgment against 
the debtor solely on the debtor’s initial failure to dispute.34  
The plain language of §§ 1692g(a)(4)-(5) and 1692g(b) specify 
that the debtor’s request must be in writing to receive verification of 
the debt or information regarding the original creditor.
35
 The 
 
 31. S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 4 (1977). 
 32. § 1692g(a)(3). 
 33. § 1692g(c) (“The failure of a consumer to dispute the validity of a debt under this 
section may not be construed by any court as an admission of liability by the consumer.”); see 
also H.R. REP. NO. 95-131, at 6 (1977) (“The committee intends that such an assumption of 
validity by the debt collector shall not constitute an admission by the consumer of the validity 
of the debt, legally or otherwise.”). The initial versions of the provision regarding validation of 
debts did not include this safeguard. Legislative hearings brought this issue to light: 
This section is troublesome in that it does not specify that the validation would be 
solely to legitimize collection efforts by the debt collector but would not constitute 
admission of the debt owed as a matter of law. This section should be modified to 
preclude collectors from using this validation process as a basis for their claim or 
defense in subsequent legal proceedings. 
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: Hearings on S. 656, S. 918, S. 1130, and H.R. 5294 Before 
the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the S. Comm. on Banking, Fin., & Urban Affairs, 95th 
Cong. 250 (1977) [hereinafter May FDCPA Hearings] (statement of Lewis H. Goldfarb, 
F.T.C.). 
 34. See Smith v. Heckler, No. CIV.A. 04-5820, 2005 WL 894812, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 
2005) (“[U]nless the debt is disputed the debt collector will proceed under the temporary fiction 
that the debt is correct as stated in the validation notice.”); Nelson v. Select Fin. Servs., Inc., 
430 F. Supp. 2d 455, 457 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (In the assumption of validity provision, “assumed 
conveys that [the debt collector] pretends or takes for granted that [the] debt is valid for 
purposes of further collection efforts . . .”). 
 35. § 1692g(a)(4) (notice must contain “a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt 
collector in writing . . .”) (emphasis added); § 1692g(a)(5) (notice must contain “a statement 
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assumption-of-validity provision, though, does not contain this 
explicit “in writing” requirement.36 
The legislative history of the FDCPA may shed some light on the 
discrepancy within the plain language of § 1692g’s provisions. A 
significant piece of legislation, the FDCPA took several years and 
undertook several forms before its enactment.
37
 The provision that 
ultimately became § 1692g was first proposed as a disclosure 
provision, and also went through multiple drafts.
38
 A section closely 
mirroring the final version of § 1692g—and first including the 
assumption-of-validity provision—did not appear until the third 
proposed FDCPA bill.
39
 This bill did not pass, and three more 
FDCPA bills failed
40
 before House Bill 5294 was proposed and was 
ultimately enacted.
41
 Each one of these bills included the assumption-
 
that, upon the consumer’s written request . . .”) (emphasis added); § 1692g(b) (“If the consumer 
notifies the debt collector in writing [of her dispute] . . . the debt collector shall cease collection 
. . .”) (emphasis added). 
 36. § 1692g(a)(3) (debt collector must send debtor notice including “a statement that 
unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the 
debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector”). 
 37. See generally legislative history of H.R. 5294, 95th Cong. (1st Sess. 1977); Consumer 
Credit Protection Act Amendment, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874. 
 38. H.R. 10191, 94th Cong. §§ 809–10 (1st Sess. 1975); H.R. 11969, 94th Cong. § 810 
(2d Sess. 1976).  
 39. H.R. 13720, 94th Cong. § 808 (2d Sess. 1976):  
Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with 
the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall send the consumer a written notice 
containing the following information: 
 (1) The amount of the debt. 
 (2) The name and address of the creditor to whom the debt was originally owed and 
to whom the debt is currently owed. 
 (3) A statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days, disputes the validity of 
the debt, the debt will be assumed as valid by the debt collector. 
 (4) If the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period 
that the debt is disputed, the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt until such 
debt collector obtains certification of the validity of the debt from the creditor and a 
copy of such certification is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector. Id. 
 40. H.R. 29, 95th Cong. § 808 (1st Sess. 1977) (introduced Jan. 4, 1977); S. 656, 95th 
Cong. § 808 (1st Sess. 1977) (introduced Feb. 7, 1977); S. 918, 95th Cong. § 809 (1st Sess. 
1977) (introduced Mar. 4, 1977). 
 41. H.R. 5294, 95th Cong. § 808 (1st Sess. 1977) (as introduced by House, Mar. 22, 
1977). 
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of-validity provision, with only minor changes in language.
42
 Not a 
single proposed assumption-of-validity provision contained a 
requirement that debtors dispute their debt in writing.
43
 Conversely, 
each bill included subsections that reflected what would become 
§§ 1692g(a)(4)-(5) and 1692g(b), and every one of those proposed 
subsections did contain an in-writing requirement.
44
 
In subcommittee hearings in March of 1977 on an earlier version 
of the bill, the American Collectors Association (ACA) submitted a 
criticism of the assumption-of-validity provision: “Present language 
is vague. It does not say ‘how to’ dispute the validity of a debt.”45 
The ACA proposed that the provision instead include language that a 
debtor must “assert[] a dispute in writing to the debt collector” to 
prevent an assumption of validity.
46
 Neither the House nor Senate, 
though, inserted the proposed in-writing requirement for the 
assumption-of-validity provision. During the hearings, at least one 
congressman expressed his belief that the FDCPA required all 
disputes to be in writing,
47
 but the other statements regarding the 
provision fail to mention any sort of writing requirement.
48
  
 
 42. H.R. 29 § 808(a)(3) (“A statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after 
receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, the debt will be assumed as valid by the 
debt collector.”); H.R. 5294 § 808(a)(3) (same, as introduced); S. 656 § 808(a)(3) (“A statement 
that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of 
the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed as valid by the debt collector.”) 
(added language in italics); S. 918 § 809(a)(3) (same). 
 43. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (noting language of proposed bills).  
 44. H.R. 29 § 808(a)(4), (b); S. 656 § 808(a)(4), (b); S. 918 § 809(a)(4), (b); H.R. 5294 
§ 808(a)(4), (b) (as introduced). 
 45. Debt Collection Practices Act: Hearings on H.R. 29 Before the Subcomm. on 
Consumer Affairs of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin., and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 202 (1977) 
[hereinafter March FDCPA Hearings] (comments of Am. Collectors Ass’n). 
 46. Id. 
 47. “[The proposed Fair Debt Collection Practices Act] gives the collector the absolute 
right to demand a written notice from the debtor in the case of a disputed debt. And finally, the 
collector has the right to continue to communicate with the debtor until the debtor notifies him 
in writing to cease communications.” May FDCPA Hearings, supra note 33, at 45 (statement of 
Rep. Chalmers P. Wylie). In the last part of this excerpted statement, Rep. Wylie was referring 
to a separate section of the bill, which specifically requires the debt collector to cease 
communications upon written refusal “to pay or even discuss an account,” rather than to the 
debt validation section. See H.R. 5294 § 804(d) (as introduced by House, Mar. 22, 1977). 
Therefore, it’s unclear whether his comment on the collector’s “absolute right” to receive a 
written dispute is truly meant to apply to the entire FDCPA, or is simply in reference to the 
section on ceasing communications. 
 48. See, e.g., March FDCPA Hearings, supra note 45, at 141, 248–49 (comments of Am. 
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House Bill 5294 was introduced later that month. As the bill 
passed back and forth between the House and Senate, only two 
changes were made to the assumption-of-validity provision.
49
 The 
Senate added language allowing the debtor to “dispute[] the validity 
of the debt, or any portion thereof” and changed “assumed as valid” 
to “assumed to be valid.”50 Both changes were kept in the enacted 
assumption-of-validity provision, but neither clarified the ambiguity 
in the manner of the debtor’s dispute.51 House Bill 5294 was enacted 
in September of 1977 and later codified as 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq.
52
 
In its final version, § 1692g requires a debt collector to send 
written notice to the debtor, within five days of initial 
communication, of her right to dispute and to obtain verification of 
the alleged debt.
53
 A collector may violate the FDCPA if, among 
other reasons, this notice to the debtor is insufficient.
54
 Notice is 
interpreted by the “least-sophisticated-debtor” standard and may be 
found to be insufficient if it is not prominent, if the print is not large 
enough, or if it is contradicted or overshadowed.
55
 Further, notice 
may be insufficient if it incorrectly advises the debtor how she may 
trigger her rights under § 1692g.
56
   
 
Collectors Ass’n), 282–84, 288–91 (statement of Joseph M. Garber, President, Credit Bureau of 
Cincinnati); May FDCPA Hearings, supra note 33, at 5 (statement of Sen. Jake Garn), 99–100 
(statement of Kathleen O’Reilly, Exec. Dir., Consumer Fed’n of Am.), 250 (statement of Lewis 
H. Goldfarb, F.T.C.). 
 49. H.R. 5294, 95th Cong. § 808(a)(3) (as introduced Mar. 22, 1977) (“A statement that 
unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the 
debt, the debt will be assumed as valid by the debt collector.”); H.R. 5294 (as reported by 
House Mar. 29, 1977) (same); H.R. 5294 (as reported by Senate, Apr. 6, 1977) (same); H.R. 
5294 (as reported by Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Dev., Aug. 2, 1977) (“[A] statement 
that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of 
the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector.”). 
 50. H.R. 5294 (as reported by Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Dev., Aug. 2, 1977). 
 51. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3) (1977). 
 52. H.R. 5294, 95th Cong. (1977) (introduced in the House Mar. 22, 1977 and enacted 
Sept. 20, 1977). 
 53. § 1692g(a).  
 54. § 1692k(a) (allowing civil liability for “any debt collector who fails to comply with 
any provision of this subchapter”). 
 55. See, e.g., Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 1991) (“[S]tatutory notice 
must not only explicate a debtor’s rights; it must do so effectively.”). 
 56. See Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 430 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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B. Development of the Circuit Split 
FDCPA lawsuits have inspired confusion over whether certain 
notices are in fact incorrectly advising debtors of their right to 
dispute. In several cases, debt collectors sent notices stating, in some 
form, that the collector would assume the debt to be valid pursuant to 
the assumption-of-validity provision unless the debtor disputed it in 
writing within thirty days.
57
 In response, the debtors brought FDCPA 
actions, alleging that the collectors’ notice requiring that the dispute 
be in writing violated § 1692g(a)(3), which does not explicitly 
require written disputes.
58
 
In 1991, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressed whether a 
collector’s notice requiring a written dispute to prevent an 
assumption of debt validity violated § 1692g(a)(3).
59
 In that case, the 
defendant-collector sent the plaintiff-debtor a notice of delinquency 
that gave the debtor thirty days to dispute the debt in writing to avoid 
the assumption of validity.
60
 The plaintiff cited three district courts in 
Hawaii, New York, and Oregon that had all held a debtor’s dispute 
did not have to be made in writing.
61
 These opinions reasoned that 
because certain subsections of § 1692g explicitly required the 
debtor’s communication to be in writing, the absence of such 
language in the assumption-of-validity provision indicated 
congressional intent to allow non-written disputes.
62
  
The Third Circuit disagreed, though, siding with the defendant’s 
opposing interpretation: that the presence of an in-writing 
requirement in the other subsections of § 1692g indicates a 
congressional intent that subsection (a)(3) also requires written 
communication.
63
 The court assessed § 1692g in its entirety and 
decided that the plaintiff’s interpretation would lead to the following 
absurd result:
 
 
 
 57. See, e.g., id. at 1079; Graziano, 950 F.2d at 109. 
 58. See, e.g., Camacho, 430 F.3d at 1079; Graziano, 950 F.2d at 110; Hooks v. Forman, 
Holt, Eliades & Ravin, LLC, 717 F.3d 282, 283–84 (2d Cir. 2013); Clark v. Absolute 
Collection Serv., Inc., 741 F.3d 487, 489 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 59. Graziano, 950 F.2d 107. 
 60. Id. at 109.  
 61. Id. at 112. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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[The plaintiff’s] reading of the statute would . . . create a 
situation in which, upon the debtor’s non-written dispute, the 
debt collector would be without any statutory ground for 
assuming that the debt was valid, but nevertheless would not 
be required to verify the debt or to advise the debtor of the 
identity of the original creditor and would be permitted to 
continue debt collection efforts.
64
 
The court further noted that written disputes are preferable since they 
create “lasting record[s].”65 This preference and interpretation of 
congressional intent led the Third Circuit to hold that “any dispute, to 
be effective, must be in writing.”66  
In Camacho v. Bridgeport Financial, the Ninth Circuit disagreed 
with the Third Circuit’s statutory interpretation, and ultimately its 
outcome.
67
 The defendant-collector appealed the district court’s 
rejection of his motion to dismiss, arguing that the assumption-of-
validity provision included an implicit in-writing requirement.
68
 The 
defendant argued that this interpretation was necessary for 
consistency within the section itself.
69
  
The court, however, adopted a separate interpretive approach, 
looking to the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation precedent 
 
 64. Id. The court continued: “We see no reason to attribute to Congress an intent to create 
so incoherent a system.” Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. The Third Circuit upheld this interpretation in Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue 
Recovery Grp., LLC, 709 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 2013). Caprio involved a notice that did not include 
a requirement that the debtor’s dispute be written to prevent an assumption of debt validity. Id. 
at 146. The court affirmed that an oral dispute is ineffective in the Third Circuit, and found that 
the notice, which implied that the debtor could orally dispute, constituted an FDCPA violation. 
Id. at 151–52. The court stated:  
[I]t appears more likely that the “least sophisticated debtor” would take the easier—
and legally ineffective—alternative of making a toll-free telephone call to dispute the 
debt instead of going to the trouble of drafting then mailing a written dispute. We 
therefore conclude that the Collection Letter was deceptive because it can be 
reasonably read to have two or more different meanings, one of which is inaccurate, 
i.e., that Caprio could dispute the debt by making a telephone call. 
Id. at 152 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 67. 430 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 68. Id. at 1079. 
 69. Id. at 1080. 
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articulated in Lamie v. United States Trustee.
70
 The Lamie Court first 
assessed the plain meaning of a statute, in which a subsection omitted 
language that was present in other, nearly parallel, subsections.
71
 As 
long as the plain meaning did not produce an absurd result, the Court 
would not insert language, “even if it suspected that Congress 
inadvertently omitted such language.”72 The Ninth Circuit noted that 
courts should presume “that Congress acts intentionally and 
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion [of particular 
language]”73 and that “when the statute’s language is plain, the sole 
function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the 
text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.”74  
Applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit determined that the plain 
language of the assumption-of-validity provision did not require that 
the debtor dispute the debt in writing to prevent the debt collector 
from assuming the debt was valid.
75
 The court reasoned that this did 
not produce an absurd result because, even though other subsections 
of § 1692g require disputes to be in writing, other subchapters of the 
FDCPA trigger protections through oral dispute.
76
 In § 1692g, an oral 
notice of dispute merely triggers fewer protections than a written 
notice of dispute.
77
 Finally, the court looked to Congress’s purpose in 
enacting the section—in part, to give the debtor time “to question and 
respond to the initial communication of a collection agency,”78 and 
determined that these purposes were furthered in allowing a debtor to 
dispute either in writing or orally.
79
 
In Hooks v. Forman,
80
 the Second Circuit agreed with the Ninth 
Circuit, holding that a notice requiring the debtor to dispute in writing 
is a violation of the assumption-of-validity provision.
81
 The plaintiff-
 
 70. Id.; 540 U.S. 526 (2004). 
 71. Camacho, 430 F.3d at 1080–81 (citing Lamie, 540 U.S. at 534–35). 
 72. Id. at 1081 (citing Lamie, 540 U.S. at 537). 
 73. Id. (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)). 
 74. Id. (quoting Lamie, 540 U.S. at 534). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1081–82. The court specifically references 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(8), 1692h, and 
1692c(a)(1). Id. at 1082. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Hooks v. Forman, Holt, Eliades & Ravin, LLC, 717 F.3d 282 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 81. Id. at 286.  
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debtor appealed the district court’s dismissal of her complaint in 
which she alleged that the defendant-collector’s notice violated 
§ 1692g(a)(3) by requiring her dispute to be in writing.
82
 The court 
assessed both Graziano and Camacho, and adopted the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning in Camacho, but took the analysis a step further.83  
First, the court decided that allowing an oral dispute to trigger 
rights and “giving effect to the difference [in statutory language] 
creates a sensible bifurcated scheme.”84 Second, the court considered 
the relative rights and burdens of such an interpretation. For debtors, 
allowing oral disputes ensures the right “could be exercised by 
consumer debtors who may have some difficulty with making a 
timely written challenge.”85 For debt collectors, the court indicated 
that allowing a debtor to orally dispute in order to prevent an 
assumption of validity does not place a large burden on the debt 
collector.
86
 In contrast, the rights that the debtor can trigger with a 
written dispute under § 1692g(a)(4)-(5) and (b) impose a larger 
burden by placing affirmative duties on the debt collector.
87
 The 
Second Circuit recognized that this more complicated scheme could 
minimally undermine the desire for simple debtor requirements, but 
that such a concern should not override the court’s duty to follow the 
language of and congressional intent behind the statute.
88
 
Recently, the Fourth Circuit addressed this issue as a matter of 
first impression in Clark v. Absolute Collection Services, Inc.
89
 After 
summarizing the interpretations of its sister circuits, the court 
followed the Second and Ninth Circuits, holding that the assumption-
of-validity provision allows an oral as well as written dispute.
90
  
 
 82. Id. at 284. 
 83. Id. at 285–86. 
 84. Id. at 286. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. Section 1692g(4) and (5) require that the debt collector, upon receipt of a written 
dispute, obtain and send to the consumer verification of the debt and information about the 
original creditor, respectively. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(4)-(5) (1977). Section 1692g(b) requires 
that the debt collector cease collection of the debt until he obtains and provides the consumer 
with the verification or original creditor information. § 1692g(b). 
 88. Hooks, 717 F.3d at 286. 
 89. Clark v. Absolute Collection Serv., Inc., 741 F.3d 487 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 90. Id. at 490. 
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Only four circuits have addressed the manner of dispute required 
in the assumption-of-validity provision, and the Supreme Court has 
not yet had an opportunity to resolve this issue. In Jerman v. Carlisle, 
McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA,
91
 the Court noted the circuit 
split and acknowledged that the lower court, the District Court for the 
Northern District of Ohio, concluded that a notice requiring in-
writing disputes violated the FDCPA.
92
 The Court, however, declined 
to hear the issue because it was not properly raised on appeal.
93
 
III. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL 
A. Statutory Interpretation of § 1692g 
Courts on both sides of the circuit split use similar statutory 
interpretation devices to reach separate conclusions regarding the 
allowable method of dispute in § 1692g’s assumption-of-validity 
provision. Paramount to statutory interpretation is a determination of 
legislative intent.
94
 Supreme Court precedent emphasizes the plain 
language of a statute as indicative of intent, and generally abides by 
that language unless the result is absurd or the language is 
ambiguous.
95
 A function of determining legislative intent, “courts 
must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and 
means in a statute what it says there.”96 The Camacho and Graziano 
 
 91. 559 U.S. 573 (2010)  
 92. Id. at 579; Jerman v. Carlisle, 464 F. Supp. 2d 720, 725 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (“The plain 
meaning of the statute is clear and unambiguous; subsection (a)(3) does not impose a writing 
requirement on consumers.”). 
 93. The Court declined to hear the issue in a single footnote:  
Because the question was not raised on appeal, the Court of Appeals did not address 
whether Carlisle’s inclusion of the ‘in writing’ requirement violated § 1692g. We 
likewise express no view about whether inclusion of an ‘in writing’ requirement in a 
notice to a consumer violates § 1692g, as that question was not presented in the 
petition for certiorari. 
Jerman, 559 U.S. at 580 n.3 (internal citation omitted). 
 94. See, e.g., Takao Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922) (“It is the duty of 
this Court to give effect to the intent of Congress.”). 
 95. See, e.g., Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 
(2000) (“[W]hen the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where 
the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 96. Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol48/iss1/14
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015]  Debtor’s Dispute Under the FDCPA 277 
 
 
courts employed similar methods of statutory interpretation, but 
where Camacho found a sensible scheme,
97
 Graziano found the 
results absurd.
98
 
The Third Circuit in Graziano recognized that the assumption-of-
validity provision “does not expressly require that a debtor’s dispute 
be in writing[,]” but nevertheless quickly concluded that interpreting 
the provision to allow oral disputes would create an absurd result.
99
 
The debt collector would not be required to provide verification of 
the debt and would not be required to cease its collection efforts, 
since these rights are only triggered by a written dispute.
100
 The result 
would be that the receipt of an oral dispute may ruin a debt 
collector’s “temporary fiction that the debt is correct as stated”101 and 
put the collector in a position in which it may legally—though 
perhaps not ethically—pursue the debt.102 But such a result is not 
absurd or incoherent, and the plain language of § 1692g is not 
ambiguous.  
The Graziano court did not give enough weight to the plain 
language of § 1692g and did not assess enough of the section’s 
context within the FDCPA. It argued that it looked at the structure of 
the debt validation section as a whole to reach its conclusion,
103
 but 
the court should have gone further to determine whether allowing an 
oral dispute would be absurd. As the Ninth Circuit in Camacho points 
out, the Graziano court “failed to consider [other] FDCPA rights that 
are triggered by an oral dispute.”104 
The Camacho court used a Supreme Court-sanctioned statutory 
interpretation method laid out in Lamie v. United States Trustee.
105
 
The court conducted a more thorough analysis of the plain meaning 
 
 97. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 430 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 98. Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 112 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 99. Id. 
 100. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g(a)(4)-(5), (b) (1977). 
 101. Smith v. Hecker, No. CIV.A. 04-5820, 2005 WL 894812, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 
2005). 
 102. See Graziano, 950 F.2d at 112 (“[T]he debt collector would be without any statutory 
ground for assuming that the debt was valid, but nevertheless would not be required to verify 
the debt . . . and would be permitted to continue debt collection efforts.”); see also supra note 
34 and accompanying text. 
 103. Graziano, 950 F.2d at 112. 
 104. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 430 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 105. Id. at 1080–81 (citing Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004)). 
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of the assumption-of-validity provision and refused to insert language 
into the statute.
106
 Congress explicitly included a writing requirement 
in three other provisions in § 1692g, but omitted it in the assumption-
of-validity provision.
107
 Given the strong interpretational preference 
for assuming that Congress means what it says, it was entirely 
appropriate for the Ninth Circuit to refuse to add an in-writing 
requirement to the provision, even in the event of a legislative 
error.
108
 The Second Circuit’s Hooks decision and the Fourth 
Circuit’s Clark decision followed the interpretive analysis of 
Camacho, focusing on the plain language of the statute and “see[ing] 
no reason to ignore [the] difference in statutory language.”109  
The legislative history of the assumption-of-validity provision 
shows that Congress did, in fact, mean what it said. Despite five 
separate bills and in-depth hearings and reports,
110
 Congress chose 
not to include an in-writing requirement in the provision. The 
language of what became § 1692g went through multiple revisions, 
and in each version, every subsection that mentioned the debtor’s 
dispute required it to be written except for the assumption-of-validity 
provision.
111
 While a court should not insert even inadvertently 
omitted language into a statute,
112
 the omission of “in writing” was 
not inadvertent. In fact, Congress was made aware of the omission 
when the ACA argued that the language was unclear and that “in 
writing” should be added.113 The ACA also suggested an in-writing 
requirement for another section while critiquing a previous related 
 
 106. Id. at 1081. 
 107. Id. (comparing § 1692g(a)(4), (5), and (b) with § 1692g(a)(3)); see also supra notes 
35–36 (relevant statutory language). 
 108. Camacho, 430 F.3d at 1081. 
 109. Hooks v. Forman, Holt, Eliades & Ravin, LLC, 717 F.3d 282, 285–86 (2d Cir. 2013); 
Clark v. Absolute Collection Serv., Inc., 741 F.3d 487, 490 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[Defendant] asks 
that we disregard the statutory text to read into it words that are not there. We decline to do 
so.”). 
 110. See generally legislative history of 95 H.R. 5294, 95th Cong. (1st Sess. 1977); 
Consumer Credit Protection Act Amendment, Pub. L. No. 95–109, 91 Stat. 874. 
 111. See supra notes 39–44, 49–53 and accompanying text. 
 112. Camacho, 430 F.3d at 1081 (citing Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 537 
(2004)).  
 113. March FDCPA Hearings, supra note 45, at 202 (comments of Am. Collectors Ass’n). 
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House and Senate bill,
114
 and Congress included that section’s writing 
requirement in their later bill proposals.
115
 While it is unclear whether 
the adoption of an in-writing requirement for that section was due to 
the ACA’s suggestion, it is clear that Congress generally considered 
and intentionally accepted or rejected proposed revisions.
116
  
Congress, however, did not add a writing requirement to the 
assumption-of-validity provision, and the ACA nonetheless 
supported passage of the final bill.
117
 The congressional hearings 
indicate that there was little to no debate regarding the assumption-
of-validity provision following the failure of either house to change 
the provision’s language. If congressional intent is the deciding factor 
in interpretation, and Congress says what it means, then the provision 
is clear: Congress intended that a debt collector not be allowed to 
assume debt validity when the debtor has disputed the debt in any 
manner. 
B. Policy Considerations 
The Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits
118
 each cite specific policy 
reasons to support its conclusion that the assumption-of-validity 
provision should, or should not, be read to require written disputes by 
debtors. Each court emphasizes its own set of policy considerations. 
 
 114. See id. at 194 (comments of Am. Collectors Ass’n suggesting debtor’s demand that 
collector cease communication should be made in writing); May FDCPA Hearings, supra note 
33, at 121 (comments of Am. Collectors Ass’n suggesting House bill which includes writing 
requirement be adopted over Senate bill that does not). 
 115. 95 H.R. 5294, 95th Cong. § 804(d) (1st Sess. 1977) as introduced included the “in 
writing” language that was excluded from H.R. 29, 95th Cong. § 804(d) (1st Sess. 1977) 
(introduced Jan. 4, 1977); and S. 918, 95th Cong. § 805(d) (1st Sess. 1977) (introduced Mar. 4, 
1977).  
 116. The existence of extensive subcommittee hearings and oral and written testimony, 
congressional desire to gain broad support for the passage of bills, and multiple bill drafts 
further indicate Congress’s consideration of proposed bill amendments. 
 117. May FDCPA Hearings, supra note 33, at 28 (letter from Am. Collectors Ass’n 
supporting H.R. 29); id. at 146 (statement of John W. Johnson, Exec. Vice Pres., Am. 
Collectors Ass’n, supporting H.R. 5294). While ACA desired to amend the assumption-of-
validity provision the earlier bill, H.R. 29, it did not renew any contention of the provision 
when submitting its critiques of and testifying before Congress on H.R. 5294. Id. at 161; 171–
72 (prepared statement of Am. Collectors Ass’n). 
 118. While the Fourth Circuit follows the holding and statutory interpretation of the Second 
and Ninth Circuits, it does not employ policy considerations to reach its decision. Clark v. 
Absolute Collection Serv., Inc., 741 F.3d 487 (4th Cir. 2014). 
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But under a proper analysis, the considerations should all be read 
together.  
The Third Circuit in Graziano ignored many possible policy 
considerations, only favoring a written dispute requirement because 
“a writing creates a lasting record of the fact that the debt has been 
disputed, and thus avoids a source of potential conflicts.”119 While 
this argument undoubtedly supports a preference that debtors dispute 
in writing, it does not alone provide a convincing argument that 
debtors should only be allowed to effectively dispute in writing. In 
Camacho, the Ninth Circuit recognized the validity of Graziano’s 
preference for written disputes, but argued that the reasoning was 
insufficient to overcome the plain meaning analysis which points to 
the availability of oral disputes.
120
 A primary purpose of § 1692g, and 
the FDCPA as a whole, is to prevent abuses and provide debtors an 
opportunity to dispute invalid or paid debts.
121
 Giving the debtor an 
opportunity to respond to the collector’s notice either in writing or 
orally furthers these goals of debtor protection.
122
  
The Second Circuit’s decision in Hooks illuminates a related 
policy consideration. The court analyzed the relative burdens placed 
on each party by allowing oral versus written disputes.
123
 Allowing 
an oral dispute to prevent an assumption of validity does not place a 
heavy burden on the debt collector, since under the “sensible 
bifurcated scheme”124 it creates, the collector is not required to take 
affirmative steps to provide the debtor with additional paperwork, nor 
even to cease collection altogether.
125
 
Allowing debtors to orally dispute, triggering certain rights under 
the FDCPA, is an interpretation that protects debtors. Debt collection 
 
 119. Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 112 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 120. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 430 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2005) (“While there 
is much to be said for the Graziano court’s conclusion that policy considerations weigh in favor 
of its interpretation . . . under Lamie, we can only insert language into a statute if the result of 
the statute’s plain meaning is absurd.”). 
 121. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a); S. Rep. No. 95-382, at 4 (1977); Camacho, 430 F.3d at 1082 
(“Congress’ intent in enacting § 1692g was to provide an alleged debtor with 30 days to 
question and respond to the initial communication of a collection agency.”). 
 122. Camacho, 430 F.3d at 1082. 
 123. Hooks v. Forman, Holt, Eliades & Ravin, LLC, 717 F.3d 282, 286 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. 
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affects a large portion of the American population—some thirty 
million individuals as of 2013.
126
 This number may be especially high 
due to the recent Great Recession.
127
 While some instances of a bill 
going into collection result from bad luck and are quickly resolved, 
debt collection has a disparate impact on low-income Americans. 
Low-income individuals may be more likely to suffer greater 
hardships as a result of debt collection and post-judgment execution, 
such as wage garnishments—which can take up to 25 percent of a 
debtor’s paycheck—and levies on vehicles and bank accounts.128 
Disadvantaged consumers may also be more likely to suffer abuses 
from debt collection.
129
 Further, low-income individuals may be less 
likely to retain attorneys to assist with debts, since they cannot easily 
afford them
130
 (or the size of the debt does not warrant the prospect of 
 
 126. “At present, about 30 million Americans, nearly 10% of the population, are subject to 
debt collection for amounts averaging $1,500 per person, according to the CFPB.” MARGARET 
MIKYUNG LEE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43041, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 7-
5700 (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43041.pdf. This is, however, a low 
estimate. Others have suggested that closer to 77 million people—approximately 35 percent of 
the American population—have debts in collection. RATCLIFFE ET AL., supra note 3, at 7. 
 127. See LISA STIFLER AND LESLIE PARRISH, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, DEBT 
COLLECTION & DEBT BUYING: THE STATE OF LENDING IN AMERICA & ITS IMPACT ON U.S. 
HOUSEHOLDS 2 (Apr. 2014) (“For many consumers, defaulting on a loan is inevitable when 
unemployment, medical emergencies, or some other financial crisis leaves them unable to cover 
the payments. The Great Recession only made this outcome more likely for more U.S. 
households.”); Jessica Ratner, Pro Bono or Problemo: Can a Moral Obligation Effectively 
Bridge the ‘Justice Gap?’, 18 PUB. INT. L. REP. 8, 11 (2012). 
 128. See John Collins Rudolf, Pay Garnishments Rise as Debtors Fall Behind, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/02/business/economy/02garnish.html (“The 
working poor ‘have difficulties maintaining payments on life’s necessities with their full 
paycheck . . . . You lose 25 percent of it and everything folds.’” (quoting Angela Riccetti, 
Atlanta Legal Aid)); Paul Kiel and Chris Arnold, ProPublica, Old Debts, Fresh Pain: Weak 
Laws Offer Debtors Little Protection (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.propublica.org/article/old-
debts-fresh-pain-weak-laws-offer-debtors-little-protection (highlighting the difficulties of one 
family suffering from garnishments and noting that low- to moderate-income families are 
subject to higher rates of garnishments); see also CARTER & HOBBS, supra note 8, at 7 
(discussing state income and exemption laws which aim to protect low-income debtors, but 
which often have “enormous gaps . . . allowing creditors to push debtors and their families into 
financial hopelessness.”). 
 129. See STIFLER & PARRISH, supra note 127, at 18 (“[C]ommunities of color, older 
Americans, and low- and moderate-income communities experience higher rates of debt buyer 
lawsuits and abuses.”). 
 130. Ratner, supra note 127, at 11 (“In light of the recent recession, there has been a 
dramatic increase in the number of people with foreclosure, debt collection and bankruptcy 
cases who are unable to afford an attorney.”); Peggy Maisel & Natalie Roman, The Consumer 
Indebtedness Crisis: Law School Clinics As Laboratories for Generating Effective Legal 
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an equally large attorney fee)
131
 and free legal assistance agencies 
have limited resources to provide the level of assistance demanded.
132
 
Even so, every year debtors dispute approximately one million 
debts,
133
 and consumers file more FTC complaints about debt 
collection than about any other industry.
134
 Section 1692g “provides 
essential safeguards that the process does not deprive debtors of a 
realistic opportunity to dispute the merits of any account.”135  
From the standpoint of the “least-sophisticated-consumer,” an oral 
dispute should be permitted to prevent an assumption of validity.
136
 
Debtors may have a hard time communicating their dispute in written 
 
Responses, 18 CLINICAL L. REV. 133, 147 (2011) (“[L]ow and moderate income consumers, 
who may be bearing the brunt of the current crisis, are at a serious disadvantage in large part 
because of their inability to pay for legal representation.”). 
 131. Attorney’s fees can be awarded in FDCPA actions, but only if successful. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692k(a)(3). The potential to claim attorney’s fees can often induce an attorney to take on 
such a case pro bono. See Robert V. Percival & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Attorney Fee 
Shifting in Public Interest Litigation, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 237 (Winter 1984), 
available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol47/iss1/9 (“Congress has enacted fee 
shifting statutes expressly to encourage public interest litigation by removing some of the 
economic disincentives facing public interest litigants.”). Unfortunately, debtors may be 
unaware that such an award is a possibility and therefore may not seek out assistance otherwise 
available. 
 132. See Ratner, supra note 127, at 11 (“[D]ue to cuts in federal funding for the Legal 
Services Corporation (LSC), LSC-funded programs eliminated 241 full-time attorney positions 
in 2011 and expect that similar reductions will continue to be made. These organizations 
anticipate that they will also need to restrict the types of cases that they accept.” (internal 
footnote omitted)); Dave Collins, Lawyers Across U.S. Urged To Give Away More Free 
Services, HUFFINGTON POST BUSINESS (Aug. 20, 2012, 12:20 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/2012/08/20/lawyers-crisis_n_1811805.html (noting the reduction of traditional legal aid 
attorneys as well as cutbacks in large law firms’ pro bono work). The Great Recession and 
resultant cuts in free legal assistance has led to a drastic increase in the rates of self-
representation. Id. 
 133. See Lee, supra note 126, at 7 (citing FTC REPORT, supra note 4). 
 134. FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at i. 
 135. May FDCPA Hearings, supra note 33, at 733–34 (statement of the Nat’l Consumers 
League). The National Consumers League continued:  
The debt validation requirement could delay the debt collection process in those 
instances where debtors, in fact, notify the debt collector of the existence of a dispute 
. . . . [T]he objective of the entire bill . . . is to ensure debtors a realistic opportunity to 
dispute a debt sought to be collected from them.  
Id. at 734. 
 136. “The basic purpose of the least-sophisticated-consumer standard is to ensure that the 
FDCPA protects all consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd. This standard is consistent 
with the norms that courts have traditionally applied in consumer-protection law.” Clomon v. 
Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 1993); see also supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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format,
137
 or may believe that an oral dispute to the collector has 
protected them from further collection action until the collector 
validates the debt. Even if a collector’s notice explicitly states the 
debtor’s dispute must be in writing, the debtor may believe that her 
phone call to the collection agency sufficiently puts the collector on 
notice of her dispute. The debtor may therefore take no further action 
to send in a written dispute. It may too often be the case that the 
collector representative with whom the debtor speaks further leads 
the debtor to believe that her dispute will be taken seriously. As one 
court has noted, “[l]aws are made to protect the trusting as well as the 
suspicious.”138 Any attempt by the debtor to orally discuss her 
account with the collection agency should trigger as many rights as 
reasonable and allowable under the FDCPA.
139
 
For many debtors, submitting a written dispute to the collection 
agency can operate as an impediment. Testifying before the 
subcommittee considering the FDCPA, Attorney Robert J. Hobbs of 
the National Consumer Law Center said the following about the debt 
validation section: 
[C]onsumers frequently do not voice their dissatisfaction with 
the goods and services which they purchase. This silence in the 
light of dissatisfaction undermines the quality of the American 
marketplace as manufacturers, retailers and other consumers 
associate the event of a purchase without complaint as 
customer satisfaction, generating more supply of and demand 
for unsatisfactory goods and services. Given this situation, the 
law should strenuously avoid raising new impediments to the 
voicing of consumer dissatisfaction.
140
 
 
 137. Some debtors “may have some difficulty with making a timely written challenge” to a 
collector’s communication. Hooks v. Forman, Holt, Eliades & Ravin, LLC, 717 F.3d 282, 286 
(2d Cir. 2013). 
 138. Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1318 (citing F.T.C. v. Standard Educ. Soc’y, 302 U.S. 112, 116 
(1937)). 
 139. “If . . . the debt validation requirement brought the debtor into communication with 
the creditor over the merits of the account, it could have a beneficial effect.” May FDCPA 
Hearings, supra note 33, at 734 (statement of the Nat’l Consumers League, on S. 918). 
 140. May FDCPA Hearings, supra note 33, at 96 (statement of Robert J. Hobbs, Staff 
Att’y, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr.). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
284 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 48:263 
 
 
Providing written notice may be especially hard for some debtors 
who have lower levels of education or who are low-income. Not all 
households have available stamps, pen, and paper—let alone a 
computer and printer—with which to craft a dispute letter. Further, if 
the debtor wished to ensure the collector’s receipt of her dispute, her 
options include delivering it herself or sending it via certified mail, 
neither of which is an inexpensive or easy option.
141
 To require 
debtors to voice their disputes in this manner could impede the 
“voicing of [their] dissatisfaction.”142 
Further, there is often a vast difference in sophistication and 
power between debt collectors and debtors. Debt collection 
representatives often are not attorneys and therefore cannot give legal 
advice. In the instance that a debtor does come into contact with the 
collection attorney,
143
 that attorney is neither obligated nor inclined to 
give the debtor legal advice that would undermine the collector’s 
ability to collect on behalf of his client. 
As the Graziano court pointed out, there are drawbacks to 
allowing a debtor to trigger rights under the assumption-of-validity 
provision via an oral dispute.
144
 Written disputes are evidentiarily 
valuable for debtors, since a disputed debt is more likely to be 
resolved in litigation. Further, an interpretation that requires the 
dispute to be in writing makes the assumption-of-validity provision 
consistent with the other provisions in the validation of debt 
section.
145
 This would create a more simplified scheme, which 
ultimately benefits debt collectors in being able to consistently follow 
the law, debtors in understanding which rights are triggered by their 
dispute, and courts in having a hard and fast rule to apply. However, 
 
 141. Many of us may take for granted the ease of a trip across town or even to the local 
post office. However, consider the challenges some individuals face: taking time off work to go 
to the post office, finding transportation or paying for gas, deciding whether you can budget the 
more than $6.00 just to send the letter certified mail with a return receipt. See USPS, Insurance 
& Extra Services, https://www.usps.com/ship/insurance-extra-services.htm (last visited Mar. 
27, 2015) (showing certified mail cost as $3.30; return receipt as $2.70). 
 142. May FDCPA Hearings, supra note 33, at 96 (statement of Robert J. Hobbs, Staff 
Att’y, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr.). 
 143. For example, a debtor may be likely to come into contact with the collection attorney 
or his representatives over the phone—possibly after she receives an initial collection notice—
or in court pursuant to a summons or a subpoena to conduct a judgment-debtor examination. 
 144. Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 112 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 145. 15 U.S.C §§ 1692g(a)(4)–(5), (b) require the dispute to be in writing. 
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the reality of many debtors’ situations and the current trend among 
circuit courts may demand that oral disputes be allowed. 
C. Proposal: Availability of Oral Disputes 
Despite the drawbacks of having a more complex statutory 
scheme, with oral disputes and written disputes triggering different 
rights under the same section, oral disputes should be allowed under 
the assumption-of-validity provision. It may be impractical or 
impossible for some debtors to clearly communicate a written dispute 
to a debt collector.
146
 It is in the interest of the government, courts, 
and society to allow debtors to communicate disputes in the easiest 
manner possible, furthering the FDCPA’s purpose of consumer 
protection.  
Courts should therefore continue to follow the Second, Fourth, 
and Ninth Circuits, and hold that it is an FDCPA violation for the 
debt collector’s notice to require the debtor’s dispute to be in writing. 
As more circuits adopt this interpretation, it will be easier for 
collectors and debtors to know their respective responsibilities and 
rights, which will help prevent future abuses and minimize lawsuits. 
The clearest resolution of the issue—though perhaps the most 
difficult to achieve in today’s political climate—would be for 
Congress to consider making legislative changes to clarify the 
assumption-of-validity provision. The legislative history of the 
provision tends to indicate that Congress did not intend to require the 
debtor’s dispute to be in writing, but it may be time for Congress to 
amend the provision to explicitly state that a debtor may orally 
dispute, or else reassess its omission of “in writing.” Until there is 
consistency in the courts or a legislative amendment, debt collectors 
may be caught in a limbo, as they risk an FDCPA violation whether 
they require the dispute to be in writing or not.
147
  
 
 146. See supra notes 136–42 and accompanying text. 
 147. See supra note 66, discussing Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp., LLC, 709 
F.3d 142, 152 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding FDCPA violation because notice encouraged “legally 
ineffective” oral dispute). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The plain language and purpose of the FDCPA, as well as other 
policy considerations, support the allowance of an oral dispute in the 
assumption-of-validity provision. Despite reasons to prefer that 
debtors submit their debt disputes in writing, debtors should be able 
to trigger rights by disputing in the easiest manner they can—and for 
many, that is through a telephone call. The trend among the federal 
district courts is to side the with Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, 
but until the Third Circuit overturns its Graziano decision,
148
 the 
Supreme Court weighs in, or Congress amends the assumption-of-
validity provision, the circuit split will remain and even seasoned 
debt collection attorneys may not know where their notices stand.  
 
 148. Despite the trend of courts following the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits’ 
interpretation, the Third Circuit has seemed disinclined to overturn its Graziano ruling and has 
instead reaffirmed it. Id. 
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